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Introduction
The goal of the antitrust laws is to protect the competitive enterprise sys-
tem.' Economists, lawyers, and judges differ over whether the exclusive
goal of these laws is to maximize economic efficiency, or whether antitrust
laws should consider social and political values as well.2 Political values
include preservation of small business, maintenance of private control
over business enterprises, and deconcentration of economic power to
increase democratic political influence.3 Social values include equitable
distribution of wealth and protection of fair treatment in economic
dealings.4
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 1995; B.S., University of Virginia, 1992.
1. SECTION OF ANTITRuSr LAW, Ahi. BAR Ass'N, MONOGRAPH No. 12, HoRIzoNTA
MERGERS: LAW AND POLICY 5 (1986) [hereinafter HoRlzoNTm. MERGERS].
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id.
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The goal of merger law is to prevent firms from engaging in express
or tacit collusion or oligopoly behavior.5 Merger law should not prohibit
all mergers, however, because some mergers produce beneficial conse-
quences such as economies of scale and the market for corporate control. 6
Two problems arise from the application of merger law. First, merger law
attempts to predict the future: the competitive effects after two firms
become one. An inherent problem is separating the good mergers from
the bad. Second, society may decide that even though a merger may be
competitively bad, social and political goals dictate that the merger con-
tinue. Merger law must account for these value conflicts while maintain-
ing the semblance of predictability required for the effective operation of
business.
The Department ofJustice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) in the United States and the Trade Practices Commission (TPC) in
Australia recently issued new horizontal merger guidelines. Merger guide-
lines describe the approach taken by the government in evaluating merg-
ers in order to facilitate business planning. Following the procedures and
policy in the guidelines, the government agency decides if it will challenge
the merger in court as a violation of the antitrust laws.
The 1992 DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines7 represent the refinement
of over two decades of merger guidelines in the United States. 8 For Aus-
tralia, statutory amendments to the Trade Practices Act 9 have significantly
changed the standard for evaluating mergers. The changes make the Aus-
tralian approach comport more with the standard expressed in the U.S.
guidelines.
This Note wvill compare the U.S. and Australian approaches to merg-
ers as expressed by their guidelines. While the guidelines share similar
views of the underlying economic theories, merging firms in Australia pro-
ceed differently than their counterparts in the United States because of
the authorization process and the statutory basis of Australian merger law.
In Australia, an administrative procedure is the primary force behind the
regulation of mergers, whereas in the United States, the ultimate decision
is often left to the courts. This Note will focus on the differences in the
guidelines and the practical effects these differences will have on mergers
in the respective countries.
Part I of this Note describes the history and development of merger
analysis in the United States and Australia as reflected in the competition
statutes and merger guidelines. Part II compares the primary elements of
5. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoucY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE § 12.1b (1994).
6. Id.
7. AN-rrRosT Div., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, HoluzoTrAL MERGER GuIDELINES (1992),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 DOJ
GUIDELINES].
8. Charles A.James, Overview of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 61 ANTITRUST
LJ. 447, 447 (1993).
9. Trade Practices Act 1974, AuSL. C. AcTS No. 51, § 50 (1974), amended by 5
AUSTL C. A-rs No. 222 (1992).
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the most recent merger guidelines issued in the United States and Austra-
lia. This section compares the different approaches to market definition
and market shares, concentration levels, imports, entry, failure and exiting
assets, and efficiencies. This Note also analyzes the significant differences
in merger law enforcement in the United States and Australia.
I. Background
A. History Of Merger Analysis In The United States
In the United States, the FTC or DOJ challenges mergers based on section
7 of the Clayton Act:
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition, of such
stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or granting of
proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.' 0
The Supreme Court's interpretation of "substantially to lessen competi-
tion" during the 1960s caused much confusion. While lessening competi-
tion generally means higher prices, the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States" and United States v. Von's Grocery Co.12 held that a merger
likely to result in lower prices was illegal, rejecting the view that efficiency
and consumer welfare (lower prices) are more important than political
and social values. 13 Following Brown Shoe and Von's Grocery, businesses had
difficulty predicting when the government or a competitor would success-
fully challenge a merger.
Against this background, the DOJ issued Merger Guidelines in 196814
to give businesses guidance by providing a statement of policy indicating
when the government will challenge a merger.15 The 1968 DOJ Guide-
lines implicitly repudiated the Supreme Court's analysis in Brown Shoe and
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988) (emphasis added).
11. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
12. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
13. In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court found an unlawful merger when it involved
an acquired firm that accounted for no more than two percent of sales in the market.
370 U.S. at 346. The competitive threat to less efficient small retail establishments con-
cerned the Court. Id. at 339-46. Clearly, consumers would be better off after the
merger because Brown Shoe could offer shoes at lower prices. Id. A similar rationale
motivated the Court to hold a merger between two grocery store chains accounting for
a combined 7.5% of retail grocery sales in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area unlawful
in Von's Grocery. 384 U.S. at 277-79. In both cases, the Court decided that the political
and social values of small, locally owned businesses outweighed the benefits consumers
would receive through lower prices.
14. ANTTRuST Dxv., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,101 (May 30, 1968) [hereinafter 1968 DOJ GUIEaINFS].
15. Kevin J. Arquit, Perspectives on the 1992 U.S. Government Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, 61 ANTrrRUsr LJ. 121, 121-24 (1993).
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Von's Grocery by completely ignoring nonstructural factors.' 6
Merger analysis generally consists of two steps. The first step consists
of defining the market. The second step consists of predicting the effect
of the merger on market behavior. As to market definition, the 1968 DOJ
Guidelines described the relevant market in both product and geographic
terms. The market included all interchangeable products that are in a
geographic area where firms generally make sales of the products.' 7
For the second part of the analysis, the merger's effects on the mar-
ket, the guidelines adopted a strict approach. The 1968 DOJ Guidelines
promulgated bright line rules based on market concentration and the
market share of the merging firms.' 8 In response to the prevailing eco-
nomic view at the time, the guidelines adopted the structure-conduct-per-
formance paradigm (S-C-P). The S-C-P is a merger analysis model that
attempts to predict future market conduct based on market structure. 19
The basic premise of the model assumes that a merger that takes place in a
highly concentrated market is more likely to create anticompetitive effects.
The S-C-P model focuses on market concentration and the individual
firm's market share. This model presents a shortcut to analyzing the
anticompetitive relationships in the market. The S-C-P model generally
holds that market concentration gives rise to market power, and conse-
quently high prices to consumers, the bane of the antitrust laws.20
Economists soon challenged the S-C-P model, advocating that high
market concentration does not necessarily mean high prices.2 1 The most
efficient firms gain market share because they have lower costs and can
offer products at lower prices. Thus, a merger policy that focuses on
prohibiting large firm mergers does not accurately reflect the competitive
relationship between the firms. In response to this changing view of eco-
nomics, that a large market share was not necessarily anticompetitive, the
DOJ issued the 1982 Merger Guidelines.22
Preventing the exercise of market power was the touchstone of the
1982 DOJ Guidelines. Market power is the ability of one or more firms to
profitably maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period
16. While the 1968 Guidelines ignored the political and social values important in
Brown Shoe and Von's Grocery, they also expressly refused to consider efficiencies. 1968
DOJ GUIDELINFS, supra note 14, § 10.
17. 1968 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 3(i), (ii).
18. Id. § 5-6.
19. HOvENKAMp, supra note 5, § 1.7.
20. See, e.g., Leonard W. Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING 184 (HarveyJ. Goldschmid et al. eds.,
1974); Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127
U. PA. L. REv. 1104 (1979).
21. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING, supra note 20, at 164; John S. McGee, Efficiency and
Economies of Size in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 20, at
55.
22. ANTrrRusT Div., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTCE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,102 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 DOJ GUIDELINES].
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of time.23 Whereas the 1968 DOJ Guidelines defined the product market
in terms of products that were "reasonably interchangeable,"24 the 1982
DOJ Guidelines adopted a specific market definition: a market consists of
the products and geographic area in which a hypothetical monopolist
could profitably raise prices by five percent for one year.25 This "hypo-
thetical monopolist" standard continues as the cornerstone of market defi-
nition in U.S. and Australian merger guidelines. While the 1982 DOJ
Guidelines had presumptive rules about market conduct based on market
structure, the guidelines also considered factors to rebut or enhance the
presumption of market power including ease of entry, buyer characteris-
tics, past market conduct of the merging firms, and market perform-
ance.26 This consideration of nonstructural factors comported more
accurately with the economic realities of the marketplace than did the S-C-
P model. As in the 1968 DOJ Guidelines, the 1982 DOJ Guidelines did not
consider efficiencies as a merger justification.2 7
The 1984 DOJ Guidelines 28 added flexibility to the approach of the
1982 DOJ Guidelines. These updated guidelines changed the five percent
price increase of the hypothetical monopolist to a "small but significant
and nontransitory" price increase.29 The precise level, which could be
larger or smaller than five percent, would be determined by the nature of
the industry.30
The 1984 DOJ Guidelines were unique in that they explicitly consid-
ered efficiencies in evaluating the competitive consequences of mergers.
While efficiencies were not dispositive, they were considered persuasive
evidence for the first time.3 1 The 1984 DOJ Guidelines, however,
required that the parties to the merger establish the efficiencies by clear
and convincing evidence. 32 The relevance of nonstructural market char-
acteristics increased, but was "most likely to be important where the
Department's decision whether to challenge a merger is otherwise
close."33
The 1992 DOJ Guidelines depart further from complete reliance on
market structure and provide a more detailed analysis of the economic
factors important in assessing the competitive effects of the merger. The
structure of the market, measured by concentration, is no longer disposi-
tive, but only a factor weighed in the analysis.3 4 DOJ officials now judge
23. 1982 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 22, § I.
24. 1968 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 3(i).
25. 1982 DOJ GuIDEINEs, supra note 22, § IIA
26. Id. § III.C.
27. Id. § V.A.
28. ANTrrRuST Drv., U.S. DEP'T oFJusnIcE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103 (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 DOJ GUIDELINES].
29. Id. § 2.0.
30. Id. § 2.11.
31. Id. § 3.5.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 3.4.
34. James, supra note 8, at 449. The 1992 Guidelines also dropped the "clear and
convincing" standard for showing efficiencies. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 4.
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the anticompetitive effect based on the totality of the evidence, not just
market structure.3 5
The DOJ or the FTC will follow five stages of analysis under the 1992
DOJ Guidelines.3 6 In the first stage, the DOJ defines the market, meas-
ures the market shares of the members, and calculates the concentration
of the market.3 7 From this analysis of market structure, the DOJ deter-
mines whether the merger would result in the likely exercise of market
power.3 8 In stages two through five the DOJ determines whether other
considerations indicate that the exercise of market power by the merged
firm is unlikely.3 9
B. History Of Merger Analysis In Australia
Australia enacted legislation restricting anticompetitive mergers in 1974.40
The Trade Practices Act prohibits business activity which substantially les-
sens competition. 41 Section 50 of the Trade Practices Act 1974, as
enacted, prohibited mergers which substantially lessened competition, the
same standard as section 7 of the Clayton Act.42 "Substantially lessen com-
petition" generally means that prices in the relevant market will be materi-
ally higher than they would be without the merger.43
In 1977, the Australian Parliament made significant changes to sec-
tion 50 of the Trade Practices Act. First, Parliament revised section 50 to
prohibit only mergers that caused a position of dominance or strength-
ened a pre-existing position of dominance in the market."4 This created
an inconsistency: the Trade Practices Act prohibited two companies from
35. James, supra note 8, at 450.
36. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 0.2.
37. Id. § 1.0.
38. Id.
39. The five stages of analysis are:
1) whether the merger will result in a concentrated market;
2) whether the merger will likely have adverse competitive effects;
3) whether entry will be likely to counteract the competitive effects;
4) whether the merger will result in efficiency gains not achievable by other
means;
5) whether, but for the merger, either party will be likely to fail, and its assets
exit the market.
Id. § 0.2.
40. Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 9, § 50(1)(a).
41. The primary substantive sections are § 45 ("Contracts, arrangements or under-
standings that restrict dealings or affect competition"), § 46 ("Misuse of market
power"), and § 50 ("Prohibition of acquisitions that would result in a substantial lessen-
ing of competition").
42. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
43. TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION, DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.10 (1992) [here-
inafter TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES].
44. The 1977 amendment to section 50 of the Trade Practices Act of 1974 provided:
A corporation shall not acquire, directly or indirectly, any shares in the capi-
tal, or any assets, of a body corporate if -
(a) as a result of the acquisition, the corporation would be, or be likely to
be, in a position to dominate a market for goods or services; or
(b) in a case where the corporation is in a position to dominate a market
for goods or services -
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contracting to substantially lessen competition,45 but permitted mergers
that substantially lessened competition as long as the merger did not cre-
ate or enhance a position of dominance in a substantial market.46 The
rationale behind the dominance standard was to encourage mergers in
order to achieve economies of scale and to improve international
competitiveness. 47
Second, the Australian Parliament revised section 50 to prohibit
mergers only in substantial markets for goods or services in Australia, in a
State or Territory.48 Parliament altered the provision in order to prevent
merger prohibition in very small markets.4 9 U.S. law makes no such mar-
ket qualification.
In 1992, the Australian Parliament restored the original version of
section 50 of the Trade Practices Act, prohibiting mergers that substan-
tially lessen competition. 50 Section 50 continued to prohibit mergers only
in substantial markets, as it did under the dominance standard.5 1
Although lawyers and the TPC found the dominance standard easier
to apply,52 it failed to curb the exercise of market power.55 Market power
can be exercised either unilaterally by a single firm or coordinated by
more than one firm. The dominance test only prohibited the exercise of
unilateral market power by the dominant firm. Often, however, unilateral
market power could be exercised by nondominant firms, especially firms
(i) the body corporate or another body corporate that is related to
that body corporate is, or is likely to be, a competitor of the cor-
poration, or of a body corporate that is related to the corporation;
and
(ii) the acquisition would, or would be likely to, substantially
strengthen the power of the corporation to dominate that market.
Trade Practices Act 1974, AuST C. AcTs No. 51, § 50 (1974), amended by AUSTL C.
Acrs No. 81 (1977).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 50. For commentary, see George Hay & Jill Walker, Merger Policy and the
TPC's Draft Merger Guidelines, 1 COMPETITION & CoNsuMER LJ. 33, 37 (1993-1994).
47. Hay & Walker, supra note 46, at 37; A.I. Tonking, Section 50-Controlling Mergers
in the Future, 20 AusT. Bus. L. REv. 285, 287 (1992).
48. Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 44, § 50(6) (1977 amendment to § 50).
49. See Stacey L. Romberg, The Australian Approach to Mergers and Acquisitions: Merits
and Drawbacks, 13 N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181, 186 (1992). "In other words the
matter should be looked at according to the spread of activity of the merged enterprise
across the whole state and not merely or necessarily one part of it." W. McComas,
Monopolisation and Mergers: What Can Be Done, Bus. L. EDUC. CENTRE, No. 7, at 36,
quoted in Trade Practices Act 1974 § 50.40 (Butterworths Ann. 1994).
50. As ofJanuary 1993, section 50 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 provides:
(1) A corporation must not directly or indirectly.
(a) acquire shares in the capital of a body corporate; or
(b) acquire any assets of a person;
if the acquisition would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of
substantially lessening competition in a market.
Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 9, § 50.
51. 1d. § 50(6).
52. See Tonking, supra note 47, at 292.
53. TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDEUNES, supra note 43, §§ 4.13-4.14. See S. G. CORONES,
Rn.sricrrm TRADE PRAcrcr.s LAW 337 (1994).
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with strong brand loyalty in markets for differentiated products.5 4 Fur-
thermore, the dominance standard prohibited mergers that facilitated col-
lusion or coordinated interaction only if the dominant firm led the
market.5 5
Merger benefits include increased efficiencies, resulting in economies
of scale, and an enhanced market for corporate control.5 6 By abandoning
the dominance standard, the Australian Parliament did not depart from
its goal of encouraging international competition by permitting firms of
increased size.57 A merger in a highly concentrated market could result in
efficiencies which might offset the anticompetitive effects.5 8 Section 88 (9)
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 allows the TPG5 9 or the Trade Practices
Tribunal,6 0 the appellate board of the TPC, to authorize a merger with
anticompetitive effects where the public benefits. 6 1 A public benefit can
include anything of value to the community generally, including efficien-
cies resulting from the merger and all relevant matters that relate to the
international competitiveness of Australian industry.6 2 Thus, the TPG may
authorize a merger that would substantially lessen competition, but would
not be prohibited under the dominance standard.
The legislative influence on merger guidelines is much stronger in
Australia than in the United States. Whereas the U.S. guidelines are pre-
mised on the congressional intent to prohibit mergers which substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, 63 the Trade Practices
Act contains a list of statutory factors6 that must be considered by the
54. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.13.
55. "Collusion" connotes an express or tacit agreement between competing firms
without a legitimate reason, usually resulting in higher prices for the consumer. "Coor-
dinated interaction" is a broader term, encompassing anticompetitive activities among
competing firms without an actual agreement. See 1992 DOJ GUIDEUNES, supra note 7,
§ 2.1. See also TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.14.
56. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, § 12.lb.
57. Hay & Walker, supra note 46, at 37.
58. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,
58 Am. ECON. Rv. 18 (1968). The "Williamson Tradeoff" suggests that some mergers
that result in higher prices may also result in increased efficiencies. Thus, even if there
are higher prices after the merger, the increased efficiencies may indicate that the
merger is pro-competitive on balance. However, when the gain in efficiencies accrues
to the merged firm through higher profits, instead of to consumers through lower
prices, the efficiency gains may not offset the increase in market power. See
HOvENKAMP, supra note 5, § 12.2b.
59. Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 9, Part II.
60. Id. Part III.
61. Id. § 88(9).
62. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, §§ 5.14-.24.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
64. The merger factors in section 50(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 are:
(a) the actual and potential level of import competition in the market;
(b) the height of barriers to entry to the market;
(c) the level of concentration in the market;
(d) the degree of countervailing power in the market;
(e) the likelihood that the acquisition would result in the acquirer being able
to significantly and sustainably increase prices or profit margins;
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TPC.65 These statutory factors allow much less flexibility for the enforce-
ment agency in evaluating mergers. 66 The Australian TPC Merger Guide-
lines provide a framework for these factors. 6 7
The Australian guidelines illustrate a two-part approach to mergers.
During the first part, the TPC follows five stages of analysis68 to determine
whether the merger will substantially lessen competition in a substantial
market. The TPC only undertakes the second part, called authorization,
at the request of the parties.69 The TPC may only grant authorization for
the merger if the public benefits of the merger offset the anticompetitive
effects. 70 The Trade Practices Act does not define "public benefit," but
generally interprets the term expansively as including anything of value to
the community.7 ' A merger creates a public benefit if it creates efficien-
cies72 or promotes the international competitiveness of any Australian
industry.73
II. Analysis
A. Market Definition and Market Shares
The Australian Guidelines adopt the analytical approach of the U.S.
Guidelines when defining the market. The relevant market is the smallest
product and geographic markets where a hypothetical monopolist could
impose a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price
(f) the extent to which substitutes are available in the market or are likely to
be available in the market;
(g) the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation
and product differentiation;
(h) the likelihood the merger would result in the removal from the market of a
vigorous and effective competitor,
(i) the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market.
Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 9, § 50(3).
65. This list of factors is similar to the Canadian Merger Enforcement Guidelines.
See generally Paul S. Crampton, Canada's New Merger Enforcement Guidelines: A "Nuts and
Bolts" Review, 36 ANnTRUST BuL.. 883 (1991).
66. Robert Baxt, Changes to the Trade Practices Act, 20 Ausr. Bus. L. REV. 424, 425
(1992).
67. TPC Dn.-r MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.4.
68. The five stages are:
1) market definition;
2) whether the concentration thresholds suggest the merger is not likely to
lessen competition;
3) the effect of import competition;
4) the effect of barriers to entry;
5) the effect of other structural and behavioural market features.
TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 2.24.
69. Id. § 5.4.
70. Id. § 5.11.
71. Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Ass'n v. Defiance Holdings Ltd., 8 A.L.R.
481, 510 (1976).
72. TPG DRAFTr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 5.18.
73. Id. § 5.19.
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(SSNIP) .74 The SSNIP is generally around five percent but may be larger
or smaller depending on the nature of the industry.75
In Australia, the rationale behind the prior dominance standard was
to encourage the formation of larger firms with economies of scale, thus
enabling Australia to compete in the world economy.76 While this contin-
ues to be a goal of merger enforcement under the substantial lessening of
competition standard, Australia nevertheless chose not to increase the
SSNIP to, for examaple, fifteen or twenty percent in order to allow firms
more flexibility in achieving minimum efficient scale.7 7 Rather, the TPC
Guidelines allow individual firms to possess larger market shares. As the
market becomes more concentrated, the firms have a greater likelihood of
acting as the hypothetical monopolist. With a SSNIP of five percent, the
worst case scenario is that the price will rise five percent. If a SSNIP of
twenty percent was used, but with lower levels of market concentration
permitted, the presence of many small firms would make it less likely that
the conduct of the market would approach that of the hypothetical
monopolst. 78 If it did, however, consumers would be seriously hurt by a
price increase of twenty percent. By allowing larger firms without increas-
ing the SSNIP above five percent, the guidelines recognize the efficiencies
achieved by firms with large market shares. Thus, the guidelines allow a
greater likelihood of a given price increase because of increased market
concentration, but the magnitude of the price increase is at most five
percent.79
Both the Australian and U.S. guidelines define the market with a
SSNIP above the competitive price. Although the market price may be the
same as the competitive price, the market price would be lower if firms
were exercising market power.8 0
The guidelines differ in the approach taken to the supply side
response to the SSNIP. The Australian guidelines include both the
demand and supply side responses in the market, whereas the market in
the U.S. guidelines only includes the demand side response. However, the
74. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 1.11; TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 43, § 4.37.
75. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 1.11.
76. Hay & Walker, supra note 46, at 37; Tonking, supra note 47, at 287.
77. Hay & Walker, supra note 46, at 42.
78. Id. at 43.
79. Id.
80. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.37; 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES,
supra note 7, § 1.11. Use of the competitive price instead of the current market price
corrects the Supreme Court's error in market definition in United States v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The Supreme Court included the similarly
priced wax paper in the market for DuPont's cellophane because consumers would
purchase wax paper if the price of cellophane rose significantly. Id. at 394-404 (defin-
ing the relevant market). The only reason cellophane consumers considered purchas-
ing wax paper, however, was because DuPont had exercised its market power to raise
the price of cellophane so the more expensive wax paper was a viable alternative. Thus,
the Court should not have included wax paper in the market for cellophane.
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supply side response under the U.S. guidelines increases the number of
participants in the market.
The supply side response is the response of producers to an increase
in price.8 ' For example, if the price of aluminum wire rises, and copper
wire producers switch over to the production of aluminum wire, then cop-
per wire should be considered part of the market. The demand side
response is the response of consumers to an increase in price.82 If the
price of aluminum wire rises, and consumers buy steel wire instead, then
steel wire should be considered part of the market. The U.S. guidelines
include only the demand side response in market definition. 8 3 Thus, the
market under the U.S. guidelines would include aluminum and steel wire.
The copper wire producers, however, would be participants in the
market and would be assigned a market share based on their ability to
switch over to the production of aluminum wire.84 The U.S. guidelines
assign the firm a market share only when the supply response is "likely to
occur within one year and without the expenditure of significant sunk
costs of entry and exit,85 in response to a 'small but significant and non-
transitory' price increase." 86 If the supply response will not be within a
year or will involve significant costs, the firm will not be assigned a market
share, but will be evaluated under entry analysis.8 7
Compared to the Australian guidelines, the market defined in the
U.S. guidelines is narrower. The Australian guidelines include both sup-
ply and demand response in market definition.88 In the example above,
the Australian market would include aluminum, steel, and copper wire.
After determination of the relevant product and geographic markets
based on the SSNIP, the guidelines require calculation of market shares
for all firms identified as market participants. 89 The calculation of market
shares is based on the best indicator of firms' future competitive signifi-
cance. Since this varies by industry, the calculation is through dollar value
assessment of sales, shipments, or production, or through physical mea-
surement of sales, shipments, production, capacity, or reserves.90
81. 1992 DOJ Gumimu .s, supra note 7, § 1.0.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 1.10.
84. Id. § 1.32.
85. Sunk costs are the acquisition costs of assets that cannot be recovered through
the redeployment of these assets outside the relevant market. Examples include mar-
ket-specific investments in production facilities, technologies, marketing, research and
development, regulatory approvals, and testing. A significant sunk cost is one that
could not be recouped within a year. Id.
86. Id.
87. See discussion infra part ll.D.
88. TPC DRAtr' MERGER GuIDELINES, supra note 43, §§ 4.32, 4.34.
89. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 1.41; TPC DRAgr MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 43, § 4.49.
90. 1992 DOJ GuIDELINES, supra note 7, § 1.41.
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B. Concentration Levels
After market definition and market share measurement, the Australian
and U.S. guidelines provide concentration thresholds that indicate when
the merger is likely to substantially lessen competition. 91 Concentrated
markets contain firms with higher market shares. The guidelines assign a
numeric value corresponding to the degree of concentration. The con-
centration threshold is the point at which the guidelines conclude that a
merger increasing the concentration of the market is likely to create or
enhance market power or facilitate its exercise, and thus substantially
lessen competition.92
The methods of assigning a numeric value to measure market concen-
tration differ. The U.S. guidelines follow the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI)93 of market concentration, while the Australian guidelines use the
traditional four-firm concentration ratio (CR4). 94 The 1968 DOJ Guide-
lines originally used the CR4,95 but the DOJ adopted the HHI concentra-
tion measurement in 1982.96
The primary difference between the HHI and the CR4 is that the HHI
is sensitive to asymmetrical market shares, while the CR4 is not. One firm
with a large market share greatly increases the HHI.97 Economists disa-
gree over whether equality of market shares facilitates collusion.9 8 The
use of the HHI supports the view that a leading firm with a large market
share is more likely to engage in collusion and coordinated interaction.9 9
Empirical studies indicate that mergers which increase the equality of firm
sizes result in competitive benefits as long as the market consists of several
firms.Y0° The use of the HHI supports this evidence.' 0' Although the
HHI and the CR4 differ, the consequences of choosing one measure over
the other may not be that great since they generally convey the same
91. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.22; 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES,
supra note 7, § 1.51.
92. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 1.51; TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 43, § 4.48.
93. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 1.5. The HHI is calculated by squaring
the individual market shares of each of the firms participating in the market, and then
summing the squares. Id. For example, a market with five firms, each with a 20% mar-
ket share, has an HHI of 2000 (202+202+202+202+202 = 2000).
94. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUImELNEs, supra note 43, § 4.22. The four-firm concentra-
tion ratio is the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in the market. Id.
95. 1968 DOJ GUIDEINES, supra note 14, § 5.
96. 1982 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 22, § IIIA.
97. The Hi increases as the asymmetry in market shares increases. A symmetrical
market with five firms, each with a 20% market share, has an HHI of 2000
(202+202+202+202+202 = 2000). An asymmetrical market comprised of four firms with
market shares of 40-30-20-10 has an HI of 3000 (402+302+202+102 = 3000).
98. Collusion may be more likely between firms ofsimilar size since they would have
similar power and similar interests. A large firm in a generally atomistic market has less
to gain by colluding with its smaller competitors.
99. HORIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 1, at 180.
100. Paul A. Pauder, A Review of the Economic Basis For Broad-Based Horizontal-Merger
Policy, 28 ANTrrRUST BuI.- 571, 650 (1983).
101. Express collusion, however, may be more likely to succeed when all firms are
the same size. Thus, the CR4 may be more accurate.
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information. 102
A comparison of the concentration thresholds of the United States
and Australian guidelines must focus on particular market structures
because the HHIl depends much on the individual market shares. 10 3 A
postmerger HHI level of 1800 corresponds roughly to a CR4 of seventy
percent. 10 4 While the U.S. and Australian guidelines are equally strict
towards mergers in concentrated markets,10 5 the Australian guidelines are
much more liberal in moderately concentrated markets, allowing larger
postmerger market shares. 10 6
If the four-firm concentration ratio is less than seventy-five percent,
the Australian guidelines permit the merger of firms that result in a post-
merger share of less than forty percent.10 7 The U.S. guidelines can still
prohibit postmerger shares of less than forty percent. A merger between
firms with a twenty percent and fifteen percent market share in a moder-
ately concentrated market clearly violates the U.S. thresholds,' 0 8 but not
the Australian. 10 9
The concentration thresholds are similar, however, for highly concen-
trated markets since the Australian postmerger limit of fifteen percent cor-
responds roughly to a change in the HHI of 50-100.110
Thus, the Australian concentration thresholds permit the merger of
larger firms until the market becomes highly concentrated. The U.S.
thresholds address the problem earlier, preventing larger firms from
merging in moderately concentrated markets.
102. See generally HO-VENKA.mP, supra note 5, § 12.3a.
103. For example, two markets, one comprised of firms with market shares of 50-15-
5-5-5-5-5-5-5 and the other with shares of 20-20-20-15-10-10-5, have the same four-firm
concentration ratio of 75%, but the HHIs are significantly different: 2900 and 1650,
respectively.
104. HoIuzoNrAL MERGERS, supra note 1, at 190.
105. The guidelines define highly concentrated as HFH > 1800 in the United States
and CR4 > 75% in Australia.
106. In Australia, a merger will substantially lessen competition if
1) the four largest firms will have a market share of 75% or more and the merged
firm will have a market share greater than 15%, or
2) the four largest firms will have a market share less than 75% and the merged firm
will have a market share greater than 40%.
TPC DRAwr MERGER GumELINFS, supra note 43, § 4.22.
In the United States, a merger will create or enhance market power or facilitate its
exercise if:
1) the post-merger Hi is between 1000 and 1800 and the increase in H=I is more
than 100 points, or
2) the post-merger H=I is above 1800 and the increase in HI is more than 50
points.
1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 1.51.
107. TPC DRA-r MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.22.
108. The post-merger H=I would be greater than 1225 (352) and the increase in
HI would be 600 (2 x 20 x 15).
109. The merged firm would have a 35% market share, less than the 40% threshold
for markets with a CR4 < 75%.
110. The change in HIl for a 10-5 merger is 100 (2 x 10 x 5), for a 13-2 merger 52 (2
x 13 x 2), but for a 14-1 merger 28 (2 x 14 x 1).
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Although the numeric thresholds in the 1984 and 1992 DOJ Guide-
lines are identical, the wording is different. Under the 1984 DOJ Guide-
lines, the DOJ would be "likely to challenge" a merger that violates the
HHI thresholds."' A violation of the 1992 thresholds indicates that the
merger is "likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exer-
cise," the touchstone of the 1992 guidelines. 1 2 In Australia, the TPC will
want to "give further consideration" 113 when a merger violates the thresh-
olds, but parties must show that the merger will not cause "a substantial
lessening of competition." 1 4 The soft wording of the 1992 U.S. and Aus-
tralian guidelines indicates that violation of the concentration thresholds
is not dispositive of the decision to challenge the merger, but rather one
factor among several to consider when assessing the likely competitive
effects of a merger." 5 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has suggested
that market concentration is almost dispositive." 6
The U.S. and Australian guidelines consider evidence which indicates
that historical market shares may not be an accurate proxy for future mar-
ket shares. The guidelines look to the potential for change in the market,
such as when there is declining demand, and the potential for change in
the shares of the merging firms, which, for example, could be affected by
the expiration of a patent or the antiquity of the production methods."17
The U.S. and Australian guidelines recognize the importance of both
market conduct and market structure."18 The U.S. guidelines also articu-
late the precise ways that increased concentration affects competition,
through coordinated interaction 1 9 and unilateral effects.' 20 The U.S.
guidelines articulate factors contributing to these results, 121 whereas the
Australian guidelines make the general observation that "the coordinated
exercise of power will be easier the more concentrated the market struc-
ture . . .and the larger the share of the 'market leader(s) '."122 Later,
however, the Australian guidelines indicate the TPC will consider the past
111. 1984 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 28, § HLA.I(c).
112. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 1.51(c).
113. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.48.
114. Id. § 4.52.
115. James, supra note 8, at 452; TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43,
§ 4.22 ("[C]oncentration above these thresholds is not considered to give rise automati-
cally to a substantial lessening of competition. Rather it establishes the need for further
qualitative evaluation of market conditions.").
116. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) (a merger
which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market,
and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so
inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticom-
petitive effects).
117. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 1.52; TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 43, § 4.67.
118. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 2; TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 43, § 4.66.
119. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 2.1.
120. Id. § 2.2.
121. Id. §§ 2.1-.22.
122. TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.45.
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market conduct of the firm.123 Relevant conduct under the TPC guide-
lines includes price fixing, oligopoly, discounting, and conditions condu-
cive to future coordination of market power. 124 The U.S. guidelines
specify similar factors that result in anticompetitive coordinated interac-
tion: "conditions conducive to reaching terms of coordination" and "con-
ditions conducive to detecting and punishing deviations."'12 5
C. Imports
While both guidelines treat imports similarly by assigning the appropriate
market share to the importing firm,' 2 6 import competition is more impor-
tant to Australian firms because the economies of scale of overseas firms
often provide a cost advantage.' 27 Australia has low tariffs, and imports
comprise a large proportion of total sales in many markets.' 2 8 After
assigning the market shares, the TPC will consider arguments that the
market shares of importing firms do not accurately indicate their competi-
tive role.' 29 Importing firms, unlike domestic firms, may have the ability
to expand rapidly the supply of goods in response to higher prices. This is
more likely in markets for homogeneous goods.' 30 As prices rise in Aus-
tralia, firms can increase profits by diverting sales in other countries to
Australia. Since the output sent to the Australian market is likely to be a
small part of the world production, such expansion is relatively easy.' 3 '
There may be tariffs or quotas, however, that prevent the importing firms
from expanding their share. The guidelines take such factors into
account when assessing the competitive effects of imports.' 3 2
In addition, included in the TPC Guidelines is a list of relevant factors
which indicate the precise role of imports: information that domestic sup-
pliers are consistently inhibited in their pricing by import supplies, the
extent to which imports are independent domestic suppliers or the extent
to which they are brought in under the license of the merging firms and/
or other domestic suppliers, and whether the existing import supply
routes could accommodate a significant expansion of supply, without the
need to invest in sunk costs of distribution, advertising and promotion.' 3 3
While both guidelines treat imports similarly, the Australian guidelines
indicate that imports play a much more important role in their analysis.
123. Id. § 4.66.
124. Id.
125. 1992 DOJ GUIDEUNES, supra note 7, §§ 2.11-.12.
126. TPC DRArT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.43; 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES,
supra note 7, § 1.43.
127. Cf TPC DRAF-r MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.53.
128. Hay & Walker, supra note 46, at 37.
129. TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.54.
130. See Hay & Walker, supra note 46, at 44.
131. Id. at 37.
132. TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.56; 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES,
supra note 7, § 1.43.
133. TPC DRAmr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.56.
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D. Entry
The U.S. and Australian guidelines determine when effective entry is likely
to occur. Although a proposed merger may violate the concentration
thresholds, if effective entry is likely the merger will not substantially
lessen competition because the merged firm will not be able to exercise
market power. Thus, entry analysis is extremely important.' 3 4 Effective
entry occurs within a two-year period if the merged firm exercises market
power. Since it is impossible to start from scratch and enter most indus-
tries within two years, the two-year time period is important in assessing
the likelihood of entry.'35 The entry must be on a sufficient scale and
sufficiently attractive to consumers in order to restrain effectively anticom-
petitive conduct. Effective entry causes competitors to lower prices in
response to the new market entrant.
Often, a concentrated market indicates barriers to entry. "Barriers to
entry can be any feature of a market that places an efficient prospective
entrant at a significant disadvantage compared with incumbent firms."'1 3 6
Entry barriers include sunk investment, brand loyalty, accessing shelf
space, and costs associated with promotion and advertising.13 7
The 1992 DOJ Guidelines analyze the timeliness, likelihood, and suffi-
ciency of entry.'3 8 While the Australian guidelines do not follow this tri-
partite division exactly, the analysis focuses on the same concerns.13 9
Important to both is the notion that entry be likely, not merely theoreti-
cally possible.
The likelihood of entry depends on the minimum viable scale. 140
Entry is likely when it would be profitable at premerger prices. 141
Although it may be profitable for a firm to enter the market at high post-
merger prices, a rational firm will not do so if its entry will cause prices to
drop to an unprofitable level. Likewise, entry is not effective from the view
of a consumer if the entry cannot cause the prices to return to the pre-
merger level.
E. Failure And Exiting Assets
As a factor in analyzing the competitive effects of a merger in the United
States, firms can show that the imminent failure of one of the merging
firms will cause the assets of the firm to exit the market.' 42 The require-
ments for this showing are strict.' 43 Although Australian guidelines con-
sider the possible failure of one of the merging firms only when it is in a
134. See Queensland, 8 A.L.R. at 516.
135. SeeJohn C. Hilke & Philip B. Nelson, The Economics of Entry Lags: A Theoretical
and Empirical Overview, 61 AN sTrr LJ. 365, 385 (1993).
136. TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.58.
137. Id.
138. 1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, §§ 3.0-.4.
139. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, §§ 4.57-.60.
140. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, § 1.6.
141. 1992 DOJ GuIDELINES, supra note 7, § 3.3.
142. Id. § 5.0.
143. Section 5.1 of the 1992 Guidelines require that
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declining market and there is little or no prospect for new entry, they
provide for the consideration of such arguments during the authorization
process.'4 In 1976, the Trade Practices Act Review Committee suggested
that section 50 enable a statutory defense for those companies imminently
likely to go out of business. 145 Parliament did not adopt this suggestion,
possibly because the TPC has always granted authorization when failure
was likely.146 Whereas the likelihood of imminent failure is a factor under
the U.S. guidelines when deciding whether the merger is likely to create
or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise, in Australia mergers
with failing firms should be more likely because the authorization process
considers the public benefits of the merger.' 47 The public benefit of a
merger with a failing firm would include continued employment and
other benefits the firm provides to the community. 148
Two recent applications for authorization question the efficacy of the
failing company defense in Australia. The TPC denied an authorization
for a merger between the only two newspapers in Perth. The TPC decided
that the anticompetitive effects of a failing firm leaving the market and
allowing room for a new entrant may be less than the effects of allowing
the merger to increase the size of the dominant firm and effectively deter
any new entrants into the market.149 It is unclear, however, how the news-
paper customers of Perth are better off with only a morning paper instead
of two daily papers since there have been no new market entrants. 150
In a seemingly identical situation, the TPG granted an authorization
for the merger of two airline computer reservation systems, resulting in a
firm with ninety-five percent of the market.' 5 1 If the authorization had
been denied, one of the firms could have possibly failed, but at least the
threat of new entrants would have constrained the remaining firm. 152 In
light of these two applications for authorizations, it is unclear whether the
1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations in
the near future;
2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act;
3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative
offers of acquisition of the assets of the failing firm that would keep its tangi-
ble and intangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe dan-
ger to competition than does the proposed merger;, and
4) absent the acquisition, the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant
market.
1992 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 7, § 5.1.
144. TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 4.68.
145. TRADE PRACriGES Aar REIw CoMMrrrEE REPORT (1976), paras. 8.21-.24, cited in
Peter Shafron, Failing Companies, Media Mergers and the Trade Practices Act: Application for
Authorisation by West Australian Newspapers Ltd., 20 AusT. Bus. L. REv. 91, 94-95 (1992).
146. Shafron, supra note 145, at 95.
147. Id. at 97. See discussion infra part ll.F.
148. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 5.23.
149. Shafron, supra note 145, at 98.
150. Tonking, supra note 47, at 295-96.
151. Stephen Corones, Structural and Conduct Considerations in the Airline Industry:
Recent Trade Practices Commission Authorisations, 22 AusT. Bus. L. REv. 148, 149-50 (1994).
152. Id. at 151.
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TPC will grant an authorization the next time the imminent failure of a
firm is asserted as a justification for a merger in Australia.
F. Authorization and Public Benefit
If the TPC decides that a merger will substantially lessen competition, it
will inform the parties that if the acquisition continues, the TPC will chal-
lenge it in Federal Court.'5 3 The parties can either abandon the merger,
apply to the TPC for an authorization, or continue with the merger under
threat of suit.' 5 4 If the TPC grants an authorization, the merger can pro-
ceed even though it will substantially lessen competition. The Australian
authorization process is a remnant of British law.155 The only method to
initiate the authorization process is by party application. 156 The proceed-
ings are open to the public and the TPC encourages input from interested
parties.157 The TPC has thirty days to reach a decision,' 5 8 and the parties
can appeal the decision to the Trade Practices Tribunal, which has sixty
days to decide.' 59
The TPC shall not grant an authorization "unless it is satisfied in all
the circumstances that the proposed acquisition would result, or be likely
to result, in such a benefit to the public that the acquisition should be
allowed to take place."' 6 0 "Public benefit" is a broad concept defined by
the Trade Practices Tribunal to include "anything of value to the commu-
nity generally, any contribution to the aims pursued by the society includ-
ing as one of its principal elements... the achievement of the economic
goals of efficiency and progress."'' 1 While the concept of public benefit is
broad, it still must satisfy three requirements: (1) it is the result or likely
result of the acquisition, (2) it is not otherwise available, and (3) it is "sub-
stantial."'162 The Trade Practices Tribunal defines "substantial" in a rela-
tive sense. That is, the likely benefits must outweigh the detriments
flowing from the acquisition.1 63
Public benefits generally fall into three categories: efficiencies, inter-
national competitiveness, and nonefficiency values.' 6 4 Since the U.S.
guidelines only recognize efficiencies as a merger justification, the DOJ or
FTC would likely challenge a merger that the TPC could authorize in Aus-
tralia because it would increase Australia's international competitiveness
153. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 2.27.
154. Id. § 2.9.
155. Tonking, supra note 47, at 287.
156. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 5.4.
157. Id. § 5.25.
158. Id. § 2.38.
159. Id. § 2.39.
160. Trade Practices Act 1974, AusT. C. ACmS No. 51, § 90(9) (1974), as amended by 5
AusTL C. Acrs No. 222 (1992).
161. Queensland, 8 A.L.R. at 510.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 512.
164. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, §§ 5.18-.19, -.23.
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or foster political or social values. 165
1. Efficiencies
The United States and Australia consider efficiencies at different stages in
the analysis. The Australian TPC considers efficiencies only upon party
request during the authorization process.' 6 6 In the United States, on the
other hand, the DOJ or FTC considers efficiencies as a matter of course
after the concentration thresholds indicate the merger will create or
enhance market power or facilitate its exercise. 167 In both countries, if
the efficiencies offset the anticompetitive effects of the merger, then the
merger should proceed.' 68
The effect of considering efficiencies may be that mergers permitted
in highly concentrated markets would not substantially lessen competi-
tion.' 69 In a competitive market, the greater economies of scale could
have caused the high market concentration because large, integrated
firms can offer products at the lowest cost. In a noncompetitive market,
firms exercising market power because of high entry barriers or collusive
or coordinated behavior cause high market concentration. Commenta-
tors such as Robert Bork, however, question whether there actually is a
relationship between market concentration and collusion, suggesting that
a market with two equally sized firms would be competitive. 170
Efficiencies result in a public benefit through lower unit costs and
prices. 17 ' Efficiencies can include, for example, economies of scale, bet-
ter integration of production facilities, plant specialization, and lower
transportation costs.172 In order for the merger to enhance competition
on balance, the efficiencies must be greater the more significant the com-
petitive risks identified by the market concentration and market share
analysis. 173
2. International Competitiveness
The guidelines differ in the emphasis given to international competitive-
ness. The U.S. guidelines do not address international competitiveness,
while in Australia, the Trade Practices Act and the guidelines expressly
mandate that the TPC consider any "relevant matters that relate to the
international competitiveness of any Australian industry."174
165. If the DOJ or FTC choose not to challenge the merger, and a private party does
so instead, the courts may be willing to consider social and politicaljustifications for the
merger. See discussion infra part II.F.3.
166. TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 5.18.
167. 1992 DOJ GUIDELNES, supra note 7, § 1.51.
168. See discussion supra note 58.
169. Id.
170. ROBERT H. Bout, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A PoLIcY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 221
(1978).
171. TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 5.18.
172. 1992 DOJ GUIDEUNES, supra note 7, § 4.
173. Id.
174. Trade Practices Act 1974, AUSTL. C. AcTs No. 51, § 88 (1974), amended by 5
AUSTL. C. AcTs No. 222 (1992).
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In Australia, the primary justification offered in support of the domi-
nance standard was that it would allow larger firms that could be more
competitive in the international marketplace.1 75 Professor Porter argues
that vigorous domestic competition forces companies to look to global
markets to capture greater efficiency and higher profitability. Thus, a
highly competitive market at home is necessary to compete internation-
ally.17 6 Critics argue that in stressing vigorous domestic competition,
Porter identifies prerequisites to healthy domestic competition "which are
either absent or at an early stage of development in Australia."177 The
switch from the dominance standard to the substantial lessening of com-
petition standard, however, indicates that the Australian Parliament
accepted the view that domestic competition fosters international
competitiveness.17 8
Even under the substantial lessening of competition standard, the
TPC Guidelines encourage international competitiveness. First, the con-
centration thresholds in the TPC Guidelines are more relaxed than the
U.S. guidelines in less than highly concentrated markets. 179 Mergers cre-
ate larger firms as long as the market does not become highly concen-
trated. This is consistent with the proposition that larger firms are
necessary to compete in international markets.
Second, the authorization process balances efficiencies in determin-
ing whether there is a public benefit.' 8 0 Thus, in mergers that do violate
the concentration thresholds, the TPC may still authorize the merger on
the basis that the efficiency benefits offset the anticompetitive effects of
the merger.
Third, during authorization the TPC must "take into account all
other relevant matters that relate to the international competitiveness of
Australian industry."' 8 ' The increase in the real value of exports or the
substitution of domestic products for imported goods is relevant in mea-
suring the international competitiveness of Australian industry.' 8 2
3. Nonefficiency Values
The guidelines also differ in their approach to nonefficiency criteria in
evaluating mergers. Whereas the TPC Guidelines contemplate nonef-
ficiency values as a justification for an anticompetitive merger, the U.S.
Guidelines do not let nonefficiency criteria influence the decision to pro-
hibit an otherwise anticompetitive merger. U.S. case law, however, recog-
nizes social welfare as an independent reason to condemn economically
175. Tonking, supra note 47, at 287.
176. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, HAtv. Bus. Ray., Mar.
1990, at 73.
177. Tonking, supra note 47, at 294.
178. Hay & Walker, supra note 46, at 38.
179. See discussion supra part Il.B.
180. See discussion supra part II.F.1.
181. TPC DRAFT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, §§ 5.19-.20; Trade Practices Act
1974, supra note 9, § 90(9A).
182. TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 43, § 5.19.
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justifiable mergers. Thus, while social welfare can be a shield for merging
firms in Australia, it is a potential sword for those in the United States who
seek to prevent a merger.
Economic welfare is not the only concern of the authorization process
in Australia. Interpreting "public benefit" as "anything of value to the
community generally"' 8 3 leaves room for many possible justifications for a
merger.184
Social welfare is not mentioned in the U.S. guidelines. The U.S.
courts, however, have recognized noneconomic justifications for prohibit-
ing mergers that traditional methods of measuring market shares and mar-
ket concentration would not have deemed anticompetitive. In Von's
Grocery,185 the Supreme Court prevented two grocery store chains from
merging because the low prices would have threatened small corner stores
in the area. In Brown Shoe,' 8 6 the Court prevented a merger because the
lower costs of a vertically integrated firm would force the indepehdent
shoe stores out of business. In both cases the merger would have
increased competition resulting in lower prices for consumers. While
none of the DOJ merger guidelines issued since Brown Shoe and Von's Gro-
cery purport to adopt their rationale, neither case has been overruled, thus
leaving the possibility of a private party challenging a merger in the
United States on grounds other than those articulated in the merger
guidelines.
G. Enforcement
The role of the government in merger enforcement is much stronger in
Australia than in the United States. There is no private right of action to
enjoin mergers that violate the Trade Practices Act in Australia.187 Since
only the Minister or the Trade Practices Commission can enforce the
merger provisions, the policy of the current government toward mergers is
paramount.
Private parties are not, however, left remediless. They may apply for a
declaration that the merger will contravene the Trade Practices ActI
88
Once a declaratory action is filed, the TPC can intervene and request an
injunction.' 8 9
In the United States, the enforcement policies of the DOJ and the
FTC reflect the goals of the executive branch. During the 1980s, for exam-
ple, the DOJ allowed mergers that were clearly anticompetitive under the
183. Id. § 5.14 (quoting the Trade Practices Tribunal in Queensland).
184. See TPC DRAFr MERGER GuIDELINES, supra note 43, § 5.21.
185. 384 U.S. 270.
186. 370 U.S. 294; see discussion supra note 13.
187. Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 9, § 88.
188. Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 9, § 163(A) (1); CORONE, supra note 53, at
463.
189. Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 9, § 163(A) (2).
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Private parties who are unsatisfied with the efforts of the United States
government to prevent anticompetitive mergers can bring their own
injunctive action under section 7 of the Clayton Act without the acquies-
cence of the DOJ or FTC. Standing, however, is often difficult to establish
because a special antitrust injury1 91 needs to be shown. An injury which
results from a firm going out of business because the merged firm can sell
products for a lower price is not sufficient.' 92
Firms contemplating a merger in Australia can choose to go ahead
with the merger or apply for an authorization first. The act of applying for
an authorization, or the TPC denial of the authorization, does not mean
the proposed merger will necessarily "substantially lessen competition."' 9
If the TPC denies the authorization, and the parties decide to con-
tinue with the merger, the TPC has two primary advantages when it asks to
enjoin the merger in federal court under Trade Practices Act section 80.
First, the TPC has a tactical advantage because it heard the merging firms'
best arguments during the authorization process. Second, the courts can-
not consider the public benefit of the merger. 194 Only the Trade Prac-
tices Commission or the Trade Practices Tribunal can authorize a
merger.' 95 If the TPC chooses to challenge a merger in court, the court
cannot balance the anticompetitive effects of the merger against efficien-
cies, social welfare, or international competitiveness.
A public benefit, however, is only necessary after a finding of substan-
tial lessening of competition. While a court cannot grant an authorization
when one should have been granted, it can find that the merger would not
substantially lessen competition under the concentration thresholds and
thus make authorization unnecessary.
Australian judges have less flexibility because they are bound by the
statutory merger factors in the Trade Practices Act.' 96 On the other hand,
judges in the United States look to diverse Supreme Court precedent 19 7
and the legislative history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment to Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act.
190. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospetive and Pro-
spective-Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L Rv. 936, 947-51
(1987).
191. Antitrust injury means "of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent
and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo BowI-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
192. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
193. Queensland, 8 A.L.R. at 508.
194. Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 9, § 88; TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 43, § 2.28.
195. Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 9, § 88; TPC DRAFr MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 43, § 2.28.
196. Trade Practices Act 1974, supra note 9, § 50(3). See supra note 64.
197. Compare United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) with
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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Conclusion
While the U.S. guidelines are more refined, illustrating a longer history of
merger analysis, the Australian guidelines share the same underlying eco-
nomic theories. Prior to recent statutory amendments, the dominance
test in Australian merger law permitted almost all mergers in order to
allow larger firms, even when the merger was likely to lessen competition.
Now, while the Australian merger guidelines are based on a tougher statu-
tory test, they adopt a structural test that is more relaxed than that of the
U.S. guidelines, at least when applied to mergers in less than highly con-
centrated markets.
Furthermore, during the authorization process the TPC can permit a
merger based on public benefits. Thus, despite the results of the eco-
nomic analysis, the TPG can safeguard important policy goals, such as the
promotion of international competitiveness. The role of the TPC is mag-
nified further by the fact that the Australian courts cannot consider public
benefits when analyzing the competitive effects of a merger.

